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Contemporary corporate-related human rights abuses are often attributed to 
the processes of neo-liberal globalisation.1 Pressures upon nations to compete 
in the global marketplace, upon suppliers to produce ever-cheaper and ever-
faster, upon workers to accept more precarious terms of employment and 
upon communities to give up land and natural resources, all in the pursuit 
of economic growth have unveiled examples of the darker side of business 
operations within the global economy. Whereas this side was more hidden and 
less susceptible to resistance in a different era, transnational activism in this age 
– with the aid of new forms of communication technology and media – has 
enabled greater public awareness of this miscreant behaviour and the ensuing 
injustices.
Consequently, demands have been placed upon governance systems to 
provide the necessary controls and protections to allay the growing problem of 
human rights abuses occurring as a result of business activities. Transnational 
business human rights regulatory regimes (‘TBHRs’) have emerged as a means 
of managing the human rights impact of global corporate activity. This form 
of regulatory governance is often described as a necessary ‘gap-filler’ (Ruggie 
2013). Promoted as an interim solution to the problem of unfettered adverse 
business human rights impact in the apparent absence of adequate state-based 
measures, it is assumed that TBHRs fill a regulatory void. 
1 I define neo-liberal globalisation as globalisation deriving from the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ that promotes trade and financial liberalisation, privatisation and 
deregulation, openness to foreign direct investment, a competitive exchange 
rate, fiscal discipline, lower taxes and small government. Transnational business 
governance is associated with this agenda by enabling it through self-regulation and 
minimal state intervention (Tabb 2005). The typologies of globalisation and the 
definition of neo-liberal globalisation in the context of human rights are discussed 
extensively in O’Connell (2007).
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This assumption is somewhat misleading. In fact, TBHRs emerge into a 
space already occupied by state-based law and institutions, albeit that these may 
be currently weak or inefficient, or simply untested. Understood in this way, 
the emergence of TBHRs raises questions about the effects and implications of 
the interactions these regulatory instruments have with extant rights-protecting 
laws. Yet the nature and outcomes of the interactions between TBHRs and law 
remain understudied even though they may prove to be a critical indicator 
of how human rights discourse evolves in ‘globalised’ States in which non-
state actors play a prominent role in formulating norms and implementing 
regulation relating to human rights. 
The emergence of transnational business human rights regulation
TBHRs – a form of transnational business governance or transnational private 
regulation – have emerged as a means of managing the unfettered adverse 
human rights impact of global corporate activity, as well as a way to secure 
businesses’ social license to operate in the globalised context. Their application 
reflects a broader trend towards normalising private rule-making across various 
regulatory spheres. In the absence of an ‘overarching global political regime’ 
(Haufler 2000) to manage complex issues such as business-related human 
rights abuses, the shift away from state-based rule-making is seen as inevitable 
(Barendrecht 2013). The ‘regulatory fracture’ of the global economy wherein 
industries involved in highly globalised systems of production are beyond the 
state’s current regulatory reach contribute to this perception (de Sousa Santos 
and Rodriguez-Garavito 2005). 
The emergence of TBHRs thus reflects three drivers. First, a perception 
that states either lack the institutional capabilities and capacities to address the 
problem satisfactorily or, are committed to neo-liberal deregulatory policies 
that demand non-state regulatory instruments (Bartley 2003). Second, the 
corporate imperative to respond efficiently with risk management tools that 
can either quell the ensuing reputational damage or ensure the viability of 
business operations in the face of social resistance, or to deflect state-based 
regulation. Third, pressure from transnational advocacy movements to seek out 
means of holding corporations to account for human rights violations relating 
to their operations. 
We can observe these drivers playing out in many developing, globalising 
States where human rights abuses resulting from business activity are prevalent. 
Key industries harbour systemic human rights challenges, for example, poor 
working conditions in low-cost manufacturing, or disputes over natural 
resources and land resulting in violence, displacements and violations of civil, 
cultural, economic, political and social rights. Existing legal provisions either 
fail to comprehensively cover the facts of the claim or are weakly enforced. In 
these situations, the business-operating environment can permit companies to 
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be less responsive to human rights issues. Further, victims of human rights face 
significant barriers to accessing legal remedies to either prevent further harm or 
to gain compensation or reparation for harm caused. 
In the face of these challenges, transnational advocacy groups have 
supported local civil society in raising awareness at the domestic and global 
level, calling for increased corporate accountability. Under this spotlight, 
multinational corporations as well as larger domestic companies implicated 
in these rights abuses have, in some instances, sought out TBHRs as either a 
superficial means of cover, or in a genuine effort to understand and address the 
problems before they begin to pose material risks to the business. Likewise, 
communities, in tandem with civil society organisations, have also sometimes 
looked to TBHRs as a more accessible means of seeking remedy. 
TBHRs take various forms: self-regulating instruments such as corporate 
codes of conduct that are designed and implemented by companies themselves 
to ensure their own as well as their supply-chain partners’ compliance with 
human rights standards; regulatory regimes implemented through multi-
stakeholder initiatives involving companies and other actors such as non-
governmental organisations (examples include the Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil, the Ethical Trading Initiative or the Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights); or compliance mechanisms implemented by international 
or regional financial institutions which build in social and environmental impact 
assessment requirements into approval processes for loans and partnerships, 
such as the Compliance Advisory Ombudsman for the International Finance 
Corporation. Ever-new species of TBHRs proliferate to address the variety of 
issues and dynamics in the business and human rights space. 
Proponents of this trend towards transnational private regulation believe 
that these mechanisms bring the benefits of plurality: different types of rule-
making and the increase in rule-making capacity can mean thicker protection 
for human rights (Barendrecht et al. 2013). Further, TBHRs are seen to be 
more efficient and more flexible than state-based regulation, the latter being 
unduly constraining in achieving rights-based solutions when the abuses in 
question involve complex situations (Rees 2012). An often quoted example is 
that of child labour, where mediation-based mechanisms may achieve better 
outcomes by taking into account the reasons why the child is working and 
finding appropriate solutions in ways that litigation may not. 
Those more circumspect about TBHRs question whether these mechanisms 
are accountable to victims, whether the voluntary nature of some of the 
mechanisms prevents enforceability, and whether the imbalances of power 
between the victims and the companies distort the fairness of the processes 
(Deva 2012). Skeptics question the effects of TBHRs upon social change 
asking, for example, if they encourage States to further renege on their duties 
to protect human rights against corporate abuses (Perez 2011).
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In any case, the place of TBHRs within the business and human rights 
landscape is quite secure. Indeed the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011, support 
the use of TBHRs as a means to deliver due diligence as well as access to 
remedy, both being obligations associated with the Principles’ requirements of 
meeting the corporate responsibility to respect human rights and of ensuring 
greater access by victims to effective grievance mechanisms.2 
For better or worse?
The problem, however, is that analysis of TBHRs is focused mainly upon 
investigating whether they are in and of themselves effective regulatory 
instruments (that is, assessing the efficiency of these instruments in ensuring 
compliance or legitimacy) or whether they provide adequate access to remedies 
to victims. In both regards, they are often juxtaposed against state-based laws or 
legal institutions for rights-protection, assessed as either better than, or worse 
than the latter. There are, however, shortcomings in conceptualising TBHRs as 
part of a wider human rights ecosystem whereby their introduction, as a new 
species of regulatory regime, may effect the nature and functioning of other 
existing regimes as well as that of the ecosystem as a whole. 
In effect, TBHRs pluralise human rights protection by introducing into a 
traditionally public terrain alternative private fora for determining applicable 
human rights norms and standards and for adjudicating or mediating disputes 
arising in connection with corporate-related rights abuses. Not examining their 
pluralising effects precludes an understanding of whether the systemic impact 
of having TBHRs is net-beneficial or net-detrimental to protection against or 
remedy of corporate-related human rights abuses. Ignoring the question of 
how TBHRs interact with other rights-related regimes makes it difficult to 
ascertain whether they actually enhance, complement, support, marginalise or 
undermine the latter, or importantly, to assess the implications of any of these 
possible relational effects upon rights discourse and praxis. 
TBHRs, the role of law and the meaning of human rights
The role of law in protecting against and remedying corporate-related human 
rights abuses is in a state of flux. As suggested earlier, TBHRs are most often 
justified on the basis that the law has failed. The relatively slow evolution 
of law to address business and human rights can be, in part, traced back to 
normative and doctrinal barriers to finding non-state actors responsible for 
human rights violations. Consequently, most legal challenges have been based 
2 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 
2011) (by Professor John Ruggie) [hereinafter ‘The Guiding Principles’]. 
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on civil, criminal law, or administrative law,3 rather than claims for breaches 
of fundamental freedoms or rights protected under national constitutions or 
international human rights law. In pursuing such cases, whereas the harm may 
be ‘named’ as human rights abuse, the ‘claiming’ process in the dispute usually 
veers aware from addressing it as such4 (Felstiner et al. 1980). For example, 
in a tort claim, the injury may be presented as trespass to the person or the 
claim framed as negligence. According to McCorquodale, one consequence 
of this phenomenon may be that ‘we lose the powerful, challenging idea of 
human rights’ when legal challenges are framed without human rights-related 
legislation or international conventions.5 
Further, in making these claims numerous doctrinal and evidential obstacles 
present. There are also the overwhelming practical barriers to accessing the 
judicial system ranging from lack of financial resources, to simply lacking the 
capabilities to engage the legal system (Taylor et al. 2009). Having said this, 
there is an ‘expanding web of liability’ (Thompson, Ramasastry and Taylor 
(2009) cited by Zerk 2014, 14) for corporate abuses of human rights and 
there continue to be efforts to test and engage the law’s muscle in addressing 
these contemporary human rights challenges presented by corporate-related 
harms. At the international level, the current process in the UN Human Rights 
Council to explore an international treaty represents one such effort. As the law 
is evolving within a regulatory space occupied – indeed prominently so – by 
TBHRs, it is important to think about what influence or impact these may 
have upon its development. As a human rights advocate, my particular interest 
is in how TBHRs affect the development of law as a counter-hegemonic force. 
There are a number of ways in which TBHRs could affect the role of law 
– and the meaning of human rights – through their presence and interactions 
with it. For example, where the law provides few reference points for their 
decision-making, judges may reference or even show deference to the processes 
and outcomes of alternative dispute resolution proceedings provided by the 
TBHR where these are seen as relevant to a case before them6 and especially 
3 For a comprehensive account of these, see Zerk (2014) and Skinner, McCorquodale, 
and De Schutter (2014).
4 An exception to this may be the Alien Tort Claims Act cases where the US district 
courts have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort where that 
tort is committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. 
5 Presentation by Professor Robert McCorquodale, Director of the British Institute 
for International and Comparative Law at a Seminar on Transnational Corporate 
Human Rights Abuses: Delivering Access to Justice, London, UK, 17 July 2014.
6 Known as ‘legal endogeneity’, the concept developed by Lauren Edelman and her 
collaborators (Edelman et al. 2011) suggests that law acquires meaning from (and in 
this way becomes endogenous to) the social arenas it seeks to regulate. Her research 
considered how organisations that actively participate in the construction of the 
meaning of compliance with the law generate “ideologies of rationality” which in 
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where the norms and standards set by TBHRs become ubiquitous with the site 
or type of grievance.7 
TBHRs may influence rights mobilisation; for example, activists may 
disengage with the legal regime, preferring recourse to TBHR norms and 
processes as a way of confronting or resolving grievances involving affronts to 
human dignity or, alternatively, may be encouraged to pursue litigation having 
had negative experiences with TBHRs. In framing a grievance, activists may 
choose to amalgamate norms from both TBHRs as well as the law so as to 
generate hybrid understandings of rights in their rights mobilisation. TBHRs 
may influence rights consciousness, that is the way individuals and communities 
think about and act towards human rights, affecting the way they understand, 
engage with or use the law to protect their rights (Engel 2012; McCann 2012). 
TBHRs may hamper the transformative or counter-hegemonic potential of 
the law by shifting the articulation of the scope of rights, their protection and 
their remedy from a public into a private space. This could ‘create an illusion 
of accountability and thus reduce the demand for actual change’ (Chesterman 
2011, 63) that may arguably be better secured through litigation. Alternatively, 
they may actually encourage the transformative potential by offering new 
visions of how human rights could be reflected in law.
The point is little light is shed on the interactions between TBHRs and 
legal regimes. Whilst policy-makers actively promote TBHRs in line with a 
paradigmatic shift from government to governance, scant attention is being 
paid to the systemic effects and implications relating to their implementation 
upon the role of law and the meaning of human rights in contemporary 
practice. Deepening our understanding of these would be an important gauge 
of the future of human rights protection in our globalised world. 
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